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F
unctional magnetic resonance 
imaging—fMRI—opens a 
window onto the brain at work. 
By tracking changes in cerebral blood 
ﬂ  ow as a subject performs a mental 
task, fMRI shows which brain regions 
“light up” when making a movement, 
thinking of a loved one, or telling a 
lie. Its ability to reveal function, not 
merely structure, distinguishes fMRI 
from static neuroimaging techniques 
such as CT scanning, and its capacity 
to highlight the neural substrates of 
decisions, emotions, and deceptions 
has propelled fMRI into the popular 
consciousness. Discussions of the 
future of fMRI have conjured visions of 
mind-reading devices used everywhere 
from the front door at the airport 
terminal to the back room of the 
corporate personnel ofﬁ  ce.  At least 
one “neuromarketing” research ﬁ  rm 
is already trying to use fMRI to probe 
what consumers “really” think about 
their clients’ products.
But will fMRI’s utility in the real world 
ever match the power we currently 
imagine for it? Is fMRI likely to leave 
the clinic for widespread use in the 
courtroom or the boardroom? Are 
there neuroethical nightmares just 
around the corner? Or are all these vivid 
specters really just idle speculations that 
will never come to pass?
150,000 Grains of Rice
To understand the potential, and 
the limitations, of fMRI, it’s helpful 
to know how the technique works. 
The heart of the apparatus is a large 
donut-shaped magnet that senses 
changes in the electromagnetic ﬁ  eld 
of any material placed in its center, in 
particular—when a head is scanned—
the blood as it ﬂ  ows through the brain. 
When a region of the brain is activated, 
it receives an increased ﬂ  ow of 
oxygenated blood (the extremely rapid 
redirection of blood within the active 
brain is one of the underappreciated 
wonders supporting neural activity). 
This inﬂ  ux of oxygenated blood alters 
the strength of the local magnetic ﬁ  eld 
in proportion to the increase in ﬂ  ow, 
which is detected and recorded by the 
imaging machinery.
The resolution of the best fMRI 
machines—the smallest “volume 
picture element,” or voxel, they can 
distinguish and make an image of—is 
currently about 1.5 mm × 1.5 mm × 4 
mm, the size of a grain of rice. There 
are approximately 150,000 of these 
little volumes in the typical brain, and 
the immense computers hooked up 
to the scanners record and integrate 
signals from all of them. In a typical 
experiment, a subject, lying still with 
his head surrounded by the magnet, 
does nothing for thirty seconds, then 
performs some task for thirty seconds, 
then lies still for thirty seconds. For 
each voxel, the signal during the 
task is compared to the signal at rest; 
those areas of the brain with stronger 
signals during the task are presumed 
to be processing the information that 
underlies the performance of the task 
(Figure 1).  According to Joy Hirsch, 
Director of the Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Research Center at 
Columbia University, fMRI represents 
a “quantum leap” over any previous 
technology for imaging the brain. “It 
enables us for the ﬁ  rst time to probe 
the workings of a normal human 
brain,” she says. “It’s really opening the 
black box.” 
The ﬁ  rst caveat about fMRI’s imaging 
power, though, and one that every 
neuroimager stresses, is that a voxel is 
a long way from a neuron. There are 
an estimated 100 billion neurons, so at 
best, an fMRI is signaling blood ﬂ  ow 
changes associated with the increased 
activity of tens of thousands of neurons. 
As a result, says Hirsch, fMRI “falls 
short when we want to ask about 
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Figure 1. The Basics of fMRI
Blood oxygen level  –dependent signals are measured and compared between test and 
resting conditions.
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more detailed brain processes. We’re 
not learning that much about how 
neurons are doing local computing.” 
While resolution will improve over 
time, it seems unlikely that fMRI will 
ever detect the activity of individual 
neurons, and so its ability to dissect the 
“ﬁ  ne structure” of thought is inherently 
limited. (Even should it become 
possible to detect and integrate the 
workings of every neuron in the brain, 
it would still be far from clear how 
neuronal ﬁ  ring patterns translate into 
coherent, perceived thoughts, and this 
gap is unlikely to be bridged by any 
advance in imaging technology alone.)
These limitations have not prevented 
fMRI researchers from making some 
major discoveries about brain function, 
however. Hirsch, for instance, showed 
in one study that minimally conscious 
individuals still process human speech, 
and in another, that those who become 
bilingual as young children employ 
overlapping language areas in the 
cerebral cortex, while those who learn 
a second language later in life use a 
different area for the second language. 
The key strength of fMRI, she says, is 
that it provides the ability to test these 
kinds of hypotheses about structure–
function relationships in the normal 
brain.
All Sizes Do Not Fit One
But the hypotheses that can be 
tested and the conclusions that can 
be drawn are still largely about group 
averages, not about the functionings 
of individual brains, and therein lies a 
second major caveat about the use of 
fMRI beyond the clinic. John Gabrieli, 
Associate Professor of Psychology at 
Stanford University, has shown that 
distinct activation patterns in the brains 
of dyslexic children normalize as they 
improve their reading skills (Figure 2). 
It seems like a small leap from there 
to including an fMRI as part of the 
workup for a schoolchild struggling in 
the classroom. But, Gabrieli cautions, 
that small leap in fact traverses a huge 
chasm, on one side of which is the 
group data from which conclusions are 
drawn in studies, and on the other side, 
the application of these conclusions to 
the individual child. “At the moment, 
fMRI would be among the most useless 
things to do. We would love to get it to 
the point that it would be useful [on an 
individual basis],” he says, but it’s not 
there yet. “There is no single-subject 
reliability,” says Gabrieli. “Where we are 
now, I’m not aware of any applications 
for which it would be responsible to 
interpret an individual scan [based on 
group data].” 
There are similar limitations to most 
other applications of fMRI—while 
conclusions can be made about 
aggregated data, individual scans are 
for the most part too hard to interpret. 
There is not yet any real understanding 
of how brain patterns change over time 
in an individual, or how interindividual 
differences should be interpreted in 
relation to the conclusions that are 
valid for groups. This makes fMRI an 
unlikely tool for job screening, for 
instance. While one study has shown 
a brain signature in a group of white 
people that is associated with racial 
bias, denying a particular individual a 
job on the basis of such a scan would 
likely lead straight to a lawsuit, with 
experts debating whether this scan 
in this individual on this day does or 
doesn’t reﬂ  ect his underlying racial 
attitudes.
On the other hand, Hirsch has 
used individual scans to help locate 
a patient’s language structures that 
must be spared during neurosurgery. 
“If you are a neurosurgeon planning 
a resection, you don’t want an average 
brain at all. Millimeters matter.” 
But her success is precisely because 
she is not using group data to make 
inferences about the individual—she is 
not leaping over the chasm, but instead 
is toiling entirely on the other side of 
it. “The goal is personalized medicine,” 
she says.
A Little Guilty Knowledge Is a 
Dangerous Thing
Even this kind of personalized 
approach with fMRI is fraught with 
problems when researchers attempt to 
apply it outside the clinic, because of 
limitations in the technology itself. One 
researcher with ﬁ  rsthand knowledge of 
these problems is Daniel Langleben, 
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at 
the University of Pennsylvania School 
of Medicine. In 2002, Langleben 
showed that when subjects were hiding 
information in an attempt to deceive 
(so-called guilty knowledge), they had 
intense activity in ﬁ  ve distinct brain 
areas not seen when they were telling 
the truth. In effect, Langleben used the 
fMRI as a lie detector. It is potentially 
even more powerful than a standard 
polygraph test, he says, because there 
are thousands of brain regions which 
can be scanned for deception-triggered 
variation, versus only three variables—
skin conductance, respiration, and 
blood pressure—used in the standard 
polygraph. Not surprisingly, Langleben 
got a lot of press after he announced 
his results, and his experiment led 
directly to speculation that we might 
eventually see fMRIs installed at 
airports, scanning the brains of would-
be terrorists trying to deceive security 
screeners, or in courtrooms, catching 
perjurers red-handed (or perhaps red–
anterior-cingulate-gyrus-ed?).
Langleben is enthusiastic about 
the potential for an fMRI-based lie 
detector, and has even applied to the 
Department of Justice for a grant to 
develop the technology (they turned 
him down, saying it was too expensive). 
But he is also clear about how difﬁ  cult 
it will be to get one that really works 
outside the highly structured conﬁ  nes 
of the research lab. “We are a long way 
from making a working polygraph,” he 
says. Even with a “Manhattan Project” 
type effort, he speculates it would 
take at least ten years. “There are still 
essential discoveries to make along 
the way,” he says, “and there’s a good 
chance it would end in total failure.” 
It’s not just a matter of developing the 
imaging technology, he stresses—“we’ll 
need fundamental developments in 
semantics, too.” This is because “a 
lot still depends on how you ask the 
question”—the subtlest of differences 
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Figure 2. Different Activation Patterns in the 
Brains of Dyslexics As Compared to Normal 
Subjects in a Rhyming Task 
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can dramatically shift which areas of 
the brain respond. Given the sensitivity 
of the fMRI result to such seemingly 
minor perturbations, it’s hard to 
imagine it could be reliably adapted to 
the hurly-burly of an airport security 
checkpoint. 
Even well-performed scans done 
in topnotch clinics may not easily 
ﬁ  nd their way into the courtroom. 
Perhaps the least likely use of fMRI 
is in determining if a defendant is 
telling the truth, according to Hank 
Greely, Professor of Law at Stanford 
Law School, since compelling 
someone on trial to submit to an fMRI 
could be seen as a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment right against self 
incrimination, just as giving spoken 
testimony against oneself is. On the 
other hand, says Greely, DNA samples 
and ﬁ  ngerprints can be compelled—
whether a brain scan is more like 
testifying or more like submitting to a 
blood test is an open question.  Still, 
for the moment, scanning under duress 
simply isn’t feasible, since all you have 
to do to ruin a good scan is move your 
head. Motion-correcting algorithms 
can be used, but they are nowhere 
near advanced enough to correct for 
large-scale movements by an unwilling 
subject. It’s much more likely that an 
fMRI of a willing defendant would 
be introduced to convince the jury 
he is telling the truth, or performed 
before trial to rule out an innocent 
suspect. While to Greely’s knowledge 
fMRI evidence hasn’t yet been used 
in court, “it’s certain to be tried,” and 
the barrier to its admission will fall 
as both the reliability and the ease of 
administration increase. “The easier, 
the cheaper, the more pleasant a 
technique is, the more likely it is to be 
used in the legal system.” 
Other forensic uses of fMRI are 
likely to arrive sooner rather than 
later. Could scans showing diminished 
impulse control—a function 
controlled by several regions of the 
brain, including the striatum and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex—be 
used to support more lenient 
sentencing, or even acquit a defendant, 
because he couldn’t control his violent 
impulses? Or alternatively, will those 
same scans be used to argue for harsher 
sentences, since the defendant is 
clearly “hardwired” to commit similar 
crimes again? Courts already consider 
other factors, such as a history of child 
abuse, in an attempt to more fully 
understand the psychological state of 
the defendant. Will brain scans be seen 
as the ultimate “objective” look into the 
mind of the person on trial? 
Deciding all these issues of 
admissibility will be judges who will 
need to weigh competing claims from 
lawyers with competing interests, 
backed up by expert witnesses with 
competing theories. Here, the desire to 
apply the science may rush ahead of its 
demonstrated validity. 
Langleben, for one, doesn’t think 
fMRI will be legitimately ready for 
the courtroom for a long time. On 
the other hand, he says, “if you want 
to abuse this technique and claim 
that it works, you can create tests that 
will produce results—I can see how 
it could be done. We know enough 
to rig it.” But still, he says, “we have 
all the tools we need to prevent 
this—there are enough people who are 
sufﬁ  ciently honest [who would counter 
the premature use of fMRI in these 
contexts].”
For now, at least, given the problems 
inherent in current fMRI technology, 
the neuroethical nightmare scenarios 
of widespread brain scanning seem 
unlikely to come to pass, at least until 
radical advances make it far cheaper, 
much less invasive, far less sensitive to 
subtle perturbations, and with a much 
more robust ability to legitimately 
extrapolate from a ﬁ  nding about 
a group to a prediction about an 
individual. Where fMRI is concerned, 
“a penny for your thoughts” is currently 
more like “a million pennies for a 
group-averaged hemodynamic response 
to highly constrained stimuli under 
entirely artiﬁ  cial conditions.”  
In light of this, bioethical concerns 
about fMRI applications should 
perhaps be viewed not as predictions 
of a certain future but rather as worst-
case scenarios, a reminder of what we 
want to avoid.  “It’s a funny thing about 
the bioethics ﬁ  eld,” says Greely. “The 
general approach is to look for bad 
news.” 
While many of these “worst cases” 
seem highly unlikely to come to pass, 
Judy Illes, of the Stanford Center for 
Biomedical Ethics, thinks some action 
is warranted now, if only to generate 
a better understanding of the ethical 
dimensions of fMRI research. She 
notes that “bioethicists are often viewed 
as the ethics police,” but she doesn’t 
see regulations as the right path to 
shape the future uses of fMRI. Instead, 
she thinks a coalition of involved 
parties—scientists, lawyers, ethicists, 
politicians—should work together to 
develop guidelines that all will ﬁ  nd 
acceptable. “I’m not in the business of 
stopping anything.” 
What everyone apparently already 
agrees on is the need for carefully 
designed experiments and cautious 
interpretation of the data. “A huge 
message in imaging is that you really 
have to look at the experimental 
setup at the common-sense level,” 
says Gabrieli, and avoid the 
tendency to “pick the most dramatic 
interpretation.” “The public needs 
to be reminded of the limitations of 
these ﬁ  ndings,” agrees Hirsch. And 
as Langleben puts it, expressing his 
skepticism that there will ever be a 
one-size-ﬁ  ts-all, foolproof fMRI mind 
reader: “I don’t think we’ll ever be able 
to be stupid about it.”  
Further Reading
Langleben DD, Schroeder L, Maldjian JA, Gur 
RC, McDonald S, et al. (2002) Brain activity 
during simulated deception: An event-
related functional magnetic resonance study. 
Neuroimage 15: 727–732.
Hirsch J, Ruge MI, Kim KH, Correa DD, Victor JD, 
et al. (2000) An integrated functional magnetic 
resonance imaging procedure for preoperative 
mapping of cortical areas associated with 
tactile, motor, language, and visual functions. 
Neurosurgery 47: 711–721.
Kim KH, Relkin NR, Lee KM, Hirsch J (1997) 
Distinct cortical areas associated with native and 
second languages. Nature 388: 171–174.  
Temple E, Deutsch GK, Poldrack RA, Miller SL, 
Tallal P, et al. (2003) Neural deﬁ  cits in children 
with dyslexia ameliorated by behavioral 
remediation: Evidence from functional MRI. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 100: 2860–2865.
Illes J, Kirschen MP, Gabrieli JD (2003) From 
neuroimaging to neuroethics. Nat Neurosci 6: 
205.
“Neuroethical nightmare 
scenarios of widespread 
brain scanning seem 
unlikely to come to pass.”